To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution
A big-picture, conceptual history of U.S. defense strategy ever since 1775.
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Much of the history of U.S. defense over the course of 250 years has been a story of success. Insulated by two oceans and mostly friendly neighbors, but constantly ambitious at home and abroad, America has dared mighty things and often achieved them, argues defense analyst and strategist Michael O’Hanlon. After growing into a continental power, largely through force of arms, during the first half of its history, it then led the way to coalition victories in two world wars, pursued peace in the Cold War, and has contributed foundationally to the most democratic period in human history. But as historian Robert Kagan has argued, it is a more “dangerous nation” than most citizens appreciate, given that its leaders, as well as its people, are highly self-confident and activist. O’Hanlon claims that only by understanding this “national DNA” or American strategic culture and character can we hope to steer safely through the twenty-first century. He further argues that, in contrast to its consistently assertive grand strategy, there has been no single defining American “way of war” since 1775—a good thing, since security challenges of the future may not always resemble those of the past.
Praise
“To Dare Mighty Things is essential reading for all Americans seeking to ‘know themselves’ as a global military power, and for international players seeking to understand us. In clear, elegant prose, O’Hanlon traces America’s security journey from its founding to superpower status, shedding greater light on both the nation’s successes and its failures to use its power wisely.”—Robert Kagan, author of The Ghost at the Feast, The World America Made, and Dangerous Nation
“This excellent book clarifying the often complex ways America has fought its wars and maintained the peace is a must-read, filled with valuable insights for anyone serious about understanding U.S. defense strategy and its relationship to broader U.S. grand strategy throughout our history and today.”—Lt. Colonel Amy McGrath, USMC (ret.)
“A truly masterful overview of America’s Grand Strategies and Defense Strategies over the history of our Republic. Brookings’ scholar Dr. Mike O’Hanlon vividly describes America’s ways of war (and peace) over the centuries, recounting determined counterpunching in the American Revolution, the conduct of slugfests in the Civil War and the two world wars, the employment of overwhelming force in Operation Desert Storm and of precision airpower in Kosovo, and the demonstration of joint-force brilliance in the overthrows of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes (though not in all that followed), as well as the conduct of impressive civil-military counterinsurgency campaigns during the Surge in Iraq and the height of the war in Afghanistan, both of which I was privileged to command and that demonstrated how America’s men and women can be true ‘decathletes’ on the battlefield when needed.”—General David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.), former director of the CIA, and coauthor of Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza
"This page-turning, myth-busting analysis of America’s often very assertive defense strategies since the Revolution is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the application of U.S. military power in the twenty-first century.”—Caitlin Talmadge, author of The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes
Aspen Strategy Group Book of the Week, January 30, 2026
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Why I Wrote This Book
I decided to write this book, To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution, not just because it will be published in the year of our nation’s 250th birthday—though that fact provided nice framing. My interest came from wanting to know American military history with greater sophistication and clarity than I had developed previously in my education and career. As you know, authors often write books because we want to learn about a subject ourselves, while also hopefully making it inviting to our readers. But in addition, I was intrigued by the question about whether there is “an American way of war” as well as a distinctive American military culture—call it strategic DNA. Are there patterns and tendencies to our behavior concerning when, how, and if we fight? Are there some kinds of combat we are better at than others? Are we good at war? Are we good at peace and at preventing war?
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I won’t get into the reasoning here, but in short, I decided there is no distinctive American way of war—no single type of battle in which we specialize as a country. On this matter, I picked up the question that the great Russell Weigley posed in his famous book, The American Way of War, back in the 1970s. But I had 50 more years of history to work with than he had. Sure, we as a nation sometimes specialize in big, high-end, industrial-scale combat—especially starting with the Civil War and then for roughly the next century or so. But the American Revolution wasn’t like that, the U.S.-Mexico War and battles against Native Americans weren’t like that, the surge in Iraq and campaigns against al-Qaeda and ISIS weren’t like that, and the successful deterrence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War wasn’t really like that either. Nor, I would argue, should our current and future efforts to deter war with China and Russia rely first and foremost on just military mass and firepower (even if a certain amount of each is surely required).
Yet I do think there is an American strategic culture. We are a very activist and assertive people in foreign policy and in military matters. We have never really been isolationist, except maybe in the 1920s and 1930s, and even then, the American armed forces were innovating and experimenting in ways that would pay handsome dividends in World War II. We spent the first half of our history turning what had been a modest country hugging the east coast of half of North America into a giant continental power. The Louisiana Purchase and “Seward’s Folly,” or the purchase of Alaska, contributed to our growth, but most of it happened through force of arms. Ideas like the Monroe Doctrine and, eight decades later, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine indicated our interest in controlling events throughout much of the Western Hemisphere, even when we couldn’t really do so. Until World War II, we tended to be very economical in our military postures, budgets, and deployments. But it was often a ruthless efficiency as opposed to any retreatism or genuine minimalism that defined our military strategies. We built just enough power for the next great and mighty task, but not more and not less, as a rule. The United States has, as a nation, generally been a positive influence on this planet, I would argue. But the book shows that we have rarely, if ever, been a passive and pacifist people.